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RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES: THE SECOND
RESTATEMENT ADOPTS WAIT AND SEE
INTRODUCTION
When the second Restatement of Property is issued, it will
recommend that American courts use the wait-and-see ap-
proach in their application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to
donative transfer instruments.' The new policy represents a
radical departure from the majority view that the Rule sets a
strict social limitation on the disposition of property that the
courts are duty-bound to apply.' This limitation was expressed
by John Chipman Gray as the mechanistic formula: "No inter-
est is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years after some life in being at the creation of the inter-
est."
3
The injection of wait and see is in a small sense revolution-
ary because it is the beginning of an implicit recharacterization
of the Rule Against Perpetuities from a rule of rigid limitation
to a rule of construction. While wait and see purports to have
© 1979 by Leedia Gordeev Jacobs.
1. On May 18, 1979 the American Law Institute approved the policy contained
in a second draft of what will comprise the second Restatement of the Law of Property
on donative transfers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1979)[hereinafter cited as Draft]. The first draft adopting the wait-and-
see approach was the subject of eloquent debate at the May, 1978 meeting, with
opposition to the new view led by no less an authority than Richard R. Powell, Reporter
in 1944 for the first AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
(1944)[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Objection to wait and see focused on the
lack of statutory and judicial authority for adopting the new view and general difficul-
ties with the new policy.
2. In most states the rule still is usually applied in the manner John Chipman
Gray recommended:
The Rule Against Perpetuities is not a rule of construction, but a
peremptory command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a test,
more or less artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to defeat inten-
tion. Therefore every provision in a will or settlement is to be construed
as if the Rule did not exist, and then to the provision so construed the
Rule is to be remorselessly applied.
J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES § 629 (4th ed. 1942).
3. Id. § 201. It has been suggested that the addition of the words "generally
speaking" at the beginning, as well as putting the word vest in quotation marks, would
more accurately reflect the formulation actually used by the courts. Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 63, 639 (1938).
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a relatively minor substantive influence, its acceptance is in
fact an erosion of one of the most entrenched rules of law for
the disposition of property.
This comment has a dual thesis: first, recharacterization
of the Rule is being permitted without adequate justification;
second, if the Rule is to be liberalized, cy pres is a better alter-
native than wait and soe because it yields an immediate deci-
sion on the validity of an instrument. The comment will define
the alternatives and show how the one to be incorporated in the
second Restatement-wait and see-will work. It will suggest
some alternate measures that could have made the Rule less
harsh without changing its basic character. Justifications for
the new policy will be examined and refuted. Finally, treat-
ment of the Rule Against Perpetuities in California, and the
impact of the new policy on a state that already has a modify-
ing but conflicting statute, will be discussed. The comment
concludes that wait and see is an unsatisfactory half-way mea-
sure which will create more problems than it solves. If the time
has come to change the Rule Against Perpetuities into a rule
of construction, that fact should be acknowledged and the best
possible construction-cy pres-should be adopted.
THREE ALTERNATIVES DEFINED
The Traditional View
The common-law approach to the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties heretofore adhered to by the majority of courts in America,
applies the Rule by considering facts as they exist when the
period of the Rule begins to run, as at the delivery of a deed or
death of the testator. When an instrument is contested, the
court looks to the events that might conceivably occur, or could
have occurred, in determining if the grant fits within the time
limits for vesting set by the Rule. This is called the
'possibilities" or "what-might-happen" approach.
The results of strict application of the possibilities ap-
proach occasionally can be harsh. There is little argument that
anachronisms such as "the fertile octogenarian" or "the unborn
widow" are problems that should be eliminated. More disa-
greement survives as to how, or even if, a more basic lack of
conformation to the Rule's limitations should be ameliorated.
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The condition precedent of age contingency, class gifts, and the
vesting of executory interests fall into this latter category.'
The Wait-and-See Approach
Under wait and see, the court will consider events as they
have actually occurred since the time of the disposition in de-
termining if an interest can possibly vest or will become certain
to vest within the period of the Rule.' Thus, the decision on
validity can be postponed for as long as the duration of the
perpetuity period. Statutes in five states use a wait-and-see
approach in determining the validity of non-vested interests,'
while five apply wait and see until the expiration of life estates
in persons who are living when the Rule begins to run.'
The Cy Pres Approach
The cy pres approach, which has been commonly em-
ployed in the past to reform charitable gifts, allows a court to
rewrite an invalid disposition to effectuate a donor's intent as
closely as possible within the conformations of the Rule. The
major advantage of cy pres is that it allows an immediate deci-
sion on disposition of the property in question. The principal
disadvantage is that courts traditionally have been reluctant to
assume the role of the drafter in ruling upon a disposition.
This approach also has been adopted by framers of the
second Restatement, but only as an adjunct to be used in cer-
tain circumstances where wait and see alone leaves an unclear
result. Ten statutes adopt cy pres to reform violations of the
Rule' and five use its principles to cut invalid age contingencies
4. See notes 17-32 and accompanying text infra.
5. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERPETUITY LEGISLATION HANDBOOK 3 (3d ed. 1967).
6. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1970)(adopted 1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Page 1976)(adopted 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 6104 (Purdon
1975)(adopted 1947); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975)(adopted 1957); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 11.98.010 (1967)(adopted 1959). In addition, England, New Zealand,
Western Australia and Ontario have enacted wait-and-see statutes. See AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, supra note 5, at 5.
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1960)(adopted 1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
689.22(2)(a) (West Supp. 1979)(effective 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101
(1978)(adopted 1955); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103a (1969)(adopted 1960);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (West 1977)(adopted 1954).
8. CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1978)(adopted 1963); IDAHO CODE § 55-
111 (1974)(adopted 1957); Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1970)(adopted 1960); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 442.555 (Supp. 1978)(adopted 1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(c) (Page
1976)(adopted 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-78 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
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down to twenty-one years.'
How WArr AND SEE WILL WORK
The New Sections
Restatement of the Law Second, Property, Donative
Transfers, Tentative Draft No. 2 (Draft) incorporates the wait-
and-see approach in section 1.4, providing: "[A] donative
transfer of an interest in property fails, if the interest does not
vest . . . within the period of the rule against perpetuities." 1
(adopted 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6105 (Purdon 1975)(adopted 1972); TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1291(b) (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1963-1978)(adopted 1969); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975)(adopted 1957); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.030
(1965)(effective 1967).
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(4) (West Supp. 1978)(effective 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 30, § 194(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979)(adopted 1969); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN ch.
184A, § 2 (West 1977)(adopted 1954); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1978)(adopted
1955); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUsTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1967)(adopted 1967).
10. Draft, supra note 1, at 66. Section 1.4 of the Draft is to be used in conjunction
with § 1.5, discussed in the text accompanying notes 13-15 infra, and § 1.1, which
provides:
The period of the rule against perpetuities in donative transfers is
twenty-one years after lives in being (the measuring lives) when the pe-
riod of the rule begins to run.
Id. at 20; § 1.2 which provides:
The period of the rule against perpetuities begins to run in a donative
transfer with respect to a non-vested interest in property as of the date
when no person, acting alone, has a power currently exercisable to be-
come the unqualified beneficial owner of all beneficial rights in the prop-
erty in which the non-vested interest exists.
Id. at 27; and § 1.3 which provides for the selection of measuring lives:
(1) If an examination of the situation with respect to a donative
transfer as of the time the period of the rule against perpetuities begins
to run reveals a life or lives in being within 21 years after whose deaths
the non-vested interest in question will necessarily vest, if it ever vests,
such life or lives are the measuring lives for purposes of the rule against
perpetuities so far as such non-vested interest is concerned and such non-
vested interest cannot fail under the rule. A provision that terminates a
non-vested interest if it has not vested within 21 years after the death of
the survivor of a reasonable number of persons named in the instrument
of transfer and in being when the period of the rule begins to run is within
this subsection.
(2) If no measuring life with respect to a donative transfer is pro-
duced under subsection 1, the measuring lives for purposes of the rule
against perpetuities as applied to the non-vested interest in question are:
a. The transferor if the period of the rule begins to run in the
transferor's lifetime; and
b. those individuals alive when the period of the rule begins
to run, if reasonable in number, who have beneficial interests
vested or contingent in the property in which the non-vested inter-
est in question exists andthe parents and grandparents alive
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
This simple rule is a major departure from the traditional no-
tion that if an interest is not certain to vest within the period
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, it is immediately void."
A property interest is non-vested if it is subject to an unful-
filled condition precedent that may be the occurrence or non-
occurrence of some event.' 2 This can be the birth of the individ-
ual to whom the interest is given, the attainment of a particular
age by a beneficiary, or any condition imposed by the trans-
feror upon those to whom a remainder or executory interest will
devolve.
To be fairly evaluated, this new section should be consid-
ered in conjunction with the subsequent section 1.5, which
adds a cy pres provision to aid courts in applying wait and see:
If under a donative transfer an interest in property
fails because it does not vest or cannot vest within the
period of the rule against perpetuities, the transferred
property [may] be disposed of in the manner which most
closely effectuates the transferor's manifested plan of dis-
tribution, which is within the limits of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.'3
Use of the word "may"' 4 in the section would seem to allow
fairly liberal discretion in its application. To effectuate the
transferor's manifested plan of distribution, a court may sim-
when the period of the rule begins to run of all beneficiaries of the
property in which the non-vested interest exists; and
[section (2) c. was deleted at the meeting of the American
Law Institute, May 18, 1979]
d. the donee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment alive
when the period of the rule begins to run if the exercise of such
power could affect the non-vested interest in question.
A child in gestation when the period of the rule begins to run who is later
born alive is treated as a life in being at the time the period of the rule
begins and, hence, may be a measuring life.
Id. at 48-49. Section 1.4 does not apply to charitable gifts. These are subject to § 1.6,
which provides:
If under a donative transfer an interest in property transferred to a
charity does not vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities, it
fails unless it would divest a valid interest in another charity, in which
case it does not fail on the ground of the rule against perpetuities, even
though the divestiture does not occur within the period of the rule.
Id. at 127.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Tent. Draft No.1,
March 15, 1978) 65.
12. Draft, supra note 1, at 66.
13. Id. at 108.
14. "May" was substituted for "shall" at the meeting of the American Law
Institute, May 18, 1979. Id.
1979] 1067
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ply eliminate interests that fail while allowing the remaining
ones to take effect, create interests resembling the ones that
failed, or allow otherwise valid interests to fail along with one
that has infected the entire transfer.' 5
Under the new wait-and-see approach, those who interpret
an instrument must determine if an interest cannot vest within
the period, and to do this, they must wait and see whether the
condition precedent will be fulfilled within the period of the
Rule. Only if it can be determined on the date the period of the
Rule begins to run that it is impossible under all circumstances
for the interest to vest in time, will it fail under the new policy
as abruptly as it would have under the old.'" Thus, wait and
see breathes new life into interests that traditionally would
have failed.
The New Approach Applied to Old Problems
Age contingency and class gifts. The condition precedent
of age contingency and the class gift are often interconnected
within the same disposition; for that reason they will be treated
together here. A transfer in trust with income to A for life and
distribution of the corpus to his children when the youngest
reaches twenty-five, for example, could fail under the possibili-
ties approach because it is possible for A to have children who
will not reach the required age within twenty-one years of A's
death. Similarly, the same class gift to grandchildren or issue
might be invalid because it is possible for new members of the
class to be born at a time when fulfillment of the condition
within the period of the Rule is impossible.
The wait-and-see approach will not invalidate such inter-
ests unless they in fact vest too remotely." Under the new rule,
the interests capable of vesting in time will not fail even if A
has children, if in fact all of A's children die before age twenty-
five within twenty-one years after the survivor of the measuring
lives. In applying section 1.5 to those class members whose
interests fail after the wait-and-see period, a court will have to
look to the overall objectives of the transferor in deciding
whether 1) to allow the failed interest to defeat the interests of
all class members (the same result as under the possibilities
15. Id. at 109.
16. Id. at 96.
17. Id. at 76-78.
[Vol. 191068
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
approach), or 2) to imply an interest in such members at the
age they will have attained at that date.'"
Executory interests. Non-vested executory interests that
might possibly vest beyond the period of the Rule fail immedi-
ately under the possibilities approach. Wait and see will give
them the opportunity to become vested within the period of the
Rule. In O's deed of Blackacre "to A and his heirs as long as
Blackacre is used for residential purposes, then to B and his
heirs,"' 9 B's executory interest fails under the possibilities ap-
proach because the cessation of residential use might not occur
until more than twenty-one years after the death of the survi-
vor of 0, A, and B, the measuring lives. Under the new rule,
B's interest will not fail unless residential use continues beyond
twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of 0, A, and
B. If B's interest does fail after the waiting period, application
of the cy pres provision of section 1.5 would leave A's interest
a determinable fee simple with a possibility of reverter in any
successors or devisees of 0.
The same result to B-but different overall consequences
-will obtain where B has an executory interest attached to
an initial fee simple absolute, as in a deed of Blackacre "to A
and his heirs but if A or his heirs or assigns ever use Black-
acre for other than residential purposes, Blackacre shall pass
to B and his heirs."2 Should B's interest fail to vest, the
words "to B and his heirs" are stricken from the grant, leaving
an incomplete thought. Applying section 1.5, the presumption
is made "that 0 intended A's interest to be subject to termina-
tion for non-residential use if, and only if, the interest in B does
not fail," so A is left with a fee simple absolute.' The result of
wait and see in this case is interesting in that it effectuates O's
desired use of Blackacre for at least a measuring life and
twenty-one years, whether or not B's executory interest ever
vests. Without wait and see, A receives a freely alienable inter-
est the moment B's interest is declared invalid.
The fertile octogenarian. The assumption under the tradi-
tional approach, that an aged person could have an additional
child who will not reach the specified age within the period of
the Rule, can invalidate a class interest. Under wait and see,
18. Id. at 113.
19. Id. at 84.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 111.
1979] 1069
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an interest that depends on the birth of no additional children
will fail only if in fact another child is born within the period
of the Rule and actually lives longer than twenty-one years
after the death of those designated to measure the period.2
The unborn widow. Where the unfulfilled condition pre-
cedent to an interest in property is the survivorship of a life
beneficiary and then his widow, it is possible that the benefici-
ary may marry someone who was not alive at the time his life
interest was created. Because this widow could live more than
twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of the measur-
ing lives, the non-vested interest in the property can fail. Under
the wait-and-see approach the interest will faily only if in fact
it does not vest within the period of the Rule.23
MODIFICATIONS COULD HAVE LEFT THE RULE UNSCATHED
The Rule's least productive quirks have been or could have
been handled with less drastic and more timely measures than
wait and see. The conditions precedent of survival to the pro-
bate of a will or to the administration of an estate24 are exam-
ples of unforeseen imperfections in an instrument that the
courts have corrected by using a rule of construction that re-
quired survival for only a reasonable time.25 Similar treatment
should have been accorded the cases of the fertile octogenarian
and unborn widow.
The Fertile Octogenarian
Using wait and see to solve the problem of the fertile octo-
genarian unduly postpones a relatively minor decision. The
matter is better solved by accepting evidence of fertility in the
present, rather than waiting out old age to see if in fact child-
bearing is possible. In cases where the parent in question is
obviously incapable of having more children, the Restatement
22. Id. at 74-75.
23. Id. at 75.
24. Theoretically these could occur beyond 21 years.
25. Exceptions to this constructional preference for validity can be found only
among early cases. The most recent among those is a 1938 California appellate deci-
sion, In re Campbell's Estate, 28 Cal. App. 2d 102, 82 P.2d 22 (1938), which found void
a gift to four officers of a fraternal organization because it was possible that distribu-
tion of the estate might not occur within the period of the Rule. Condition of survival
to the probate of a will would not void an instrument in California today because court




recommends a rule of construction to resolve ambiguity as to
whether the conveyor contemplated birth of additional chil-
dren to the individual. The rationale for the use of such in-
terpretive construction is that it "manifests the desire of judges
to minimize the harshness of results sometimes caused by a
literal application of the rule . . ." as it is stated."6 The excuse
for retaining the anachronism is that courts are reluctant "to
engage in the decision of borderline cases, and to make public
inquiry into the possibility of conception . ".2.."7 Such
squeamishness is outdated by improvements in medical tech-
nology. The issue could have been simply resolved with a rec-
ommendation that capability of having children be treated as
a presumption of fact, rebuttable by relevant evidence concern-
ing the parent."
The Unborn Widow
The Draft itself acknowledges that "[f]ew interests have
failed in recent years on the basis of the 'unborn widow' possi-
bility."2 If this defect in a conveyance is actually detected,",
courts can determine that the testator intended a present wife
when he used the term "wife" or "widow". The first Restate-
ment already allows the legally more effective construction
where there is ambiguity in an instrument.' The second Re-
statement should have included a modification urging courts
to use such an interpretation without resorting to a more
sweeping change.12
There is little argument that the fertile octogenarian and
the unborn widow have been unwelcome warts upon the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Using them as excuse for major surgery,
however, is unjustified.
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2210.
27. Id. at 2208.
28. See id. § 377.
29. Draft, supra note 1, at 101.
30. The Draft points out the probability that often the defect goes unnoticed
(citing Thompson v. Bray, 313 Mass. 717, 49 N.E.2d 228 (1943) Draft, supra note 1,
at 101.
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2197-98.
32. States that are not fully satisfied by such a recommendation can enact a
more definite statutory solution. This has been done in CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.7 (West
Supp. 1979)(adopted 1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(b) (West Supp. 1978)(effective
1979); and, N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967)(adopted
1960).
1979] 1071
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PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CHANGE
To justify the Rule's restructure, the Draft proffers three
arguments. First, it contends that wait and see is in one sense
a mere expansion of interpretive technique already employed
by the courts. It will be shown that such extrapolation is inac-
curate. Second, the new approach is offered as an equalization
measure to poorly drafted documents, allowing them the same
results that can be obtained by instruments that have been
more carefully conceived. However, poor draftsmanship calls
for stricter, not looser enforcement of the Rule. Third, the Draft
claims that the Rule's historical development justifies prolon-
gation of perpetuities. This premise is unfounded. Examina-
tion of the Rule's origins indicates that perpetuities were ini-
tially permitted only with the intention that they be strictly
limited. In addition to such erroneous rationalization for
adopting wait and see, the Draft failed to consider the social
implications of the new approach.
Established Doctrines Look to the Past, Not the Future
The doctrine of separability. Improper dispositions do not
always invalidate an entire instrument. Under the doctrine of
separability, incorporated in the Restatement, courts have tra-
ditionally upheld dispositions that are valid where they can be
separated from those that are not.3 3 This is based upon a desire
to effectuate a donor's intent to the greatest extent possible
within the limits of the law, and to cut it short where those
limits are exceeded. The doctrine separates language relating
to distinct subject matters, separate shares or alternative con-
ditions. Where alternative contingencies are stated, subjecting
a non-vested interest in property to two or more conditions
precedent one of which is certain to be fulfilled within the
period of the Rule, the courts save the interest if it is the legiti-
mate condition that actually occurs. For example, where B is
given an executory interest in property contingent upon either
A having no children, or A's children dying before they reach
the age of twenty-five, the first condition must occur within the
period of the Rule. Courts generally hold, therefore, that the
first of these interests is valid even though the second one is
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 376, which provides: "The validity of each
separate limitation is determined separately under the rule against perpetuities." See
also id. at 2199-207.
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not. The result is that B's interest will vest if A dies childless,
but fail if A has children.3 4
The Draft calls this "a wait-and-see approach built into
the what-might-happen approach."35 This corollary is some-
what farfetched, as the courts are merely saving interests based
upon contingencies certain to be fulfilled within the period of
the Rule by cutting out invalid dispositions. In other words,
good language is saved while the bad is stricken. There is no
waiting to see if an invalid interest will become valid at some
future time.
Under section 1.4, an interest subject to alternative condi-
tions precedent does not fail if either condition occurs within
the period of the Rule. For that matter, even where the contin-
gency is stated as a single condition precedent, providing vest-
ing in B "if no child of A attains the age of 25 years. . .," the
unexpressed, legitimate condition-if A dies childless-is
taken to be implicit.36 Thus, where the disposition would have
fallen under the possibilities approach for its total impropriety,
good language is implied under the new rule, and B's interest
is saved if A dies childless or A's children die within twenty-
one years.
It is unclear whether wait and see will replace the well-
established doctrine of separability, or if the two approaches
will somehow be intertwined. It is conceivable that a valid
interest could be separated immediately from others that re-
quire waiting. Where this possibility exists, it might be neces-
sary to choose between the interpretive techniques. Immediate
separation could prejudice a later distribution; yet, a late deci-
sion on interests that would have been saved at a timely date
under the old approach seems unfair.
The second look. The Draft takes similar liberties in the
area of interests created by, or that take in default of, the
exercise of a power of appointment. When a power of appoint-
ment is exercised during the running of the period of the Rule,"7
period of the Rule began to run, 3 courts have taken a "second
look" at the period since the power's creation, to determine on
34. Draft, supra note 1, at 86.
35. Id. at 85.
36. Id. at 85-87.
37. This is the case where it is a general power to appoint by will, or a limited
power to appoint by deed or by will, in contrast to instances where interests in property
are created by, or take in default of, the exercise of a power of appointment thus
beginning the running of the period of the Rule. Draft, supra note 1, at 81.
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the basis of facts known at the time the power is or should be
exercised, if a violation of the Rule might occur. The Draft
utilizes this authority to shift the "second look" into the future:
The rule of this section, which adopts a full wait-and-see
rule, incorporates the limited wait-and-see rule of the
"second look" and goes beyond it to permit the wait-and-
see to continue after the date the power is exercised or is
no longer exercisable."
This is a tenuous extrapolation of the "second look." Sensibly
taking into account what in fact has happened is a far cry from
waiting to see if more conditions can be fulfilled within the
perpetuity period. This jump from "second look" to wait and
see moves from the past, before the very question of validity
arose, to the future, where it will henceforth be resolved.
There is no germ of wait and see to be found in the
common-law doctrine of separability and the "second look." In
fact, an examination of the cases involving these doctrines re-
veals a consistent rejection by the courts of wait and see.3"
Draftsmanship Difficulties Argue for a Strong Rule
One of the major justifications for adopting the wait-and-
see approach is that it will merely compensate for poor drafts-
manship. 0 Clients without expert attorneys can thus obtain an
equal chance to dispose of their estates according to their de-
sires-as if in answer to the criticism put forth by W. Barton
Leach in 1952:
38. Id.
39. This rejection and the possibility of a new trend in California is discussed in
text accompanying notes 65-75. See In re Kober Trust Fund, 26 Cal. App. 3d 265, 103
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972); Estate of Gump, 16 Cal. 2d 535, 107 P.2d 17 (1942); Sheean v.
Michel, 6 Cal. 2d 324, 57 P.2d 127 (1936); Estate of Troy, 214 Cal. 53, 3 P.2d 930 (1931);
Estate of Steele, 124 Cal. 533, 57 P. 564 (1899); Connecticut Bank and Trust Company
v. Brody, 174 Conn. 616, 392 A.2d 445 (1978); and, Hagemann v. National Bank &
Trust Co., 218 Va. 333, 237 S.E.2d 388 (1977). In addition, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS, 142-43 app. (Tent. Draft No.1, 1978), where R.R.
Powell notes that he has compiled a list of 44 cases in support of the possibilities
approach, and refutes any suggestion that wait and see has gained court support.
Thorough examination of these could yield a comment equal in length to this one.
40. The what-might-happen approach is nothing more than a trap
that is easily avoided by appropriate drafting. The adoption of the wait-
and-see approach in this Restatement is largely motivated by the equal-
ity of treatment that is produced by placing the validity of all non-vested
interests on the same plane, whether the interest is created by a skilled
draftsman or one not so skilled.
Draft, supra note 1, at 17.
1074 [Vol. 19
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I do not recall a single twentieth-century case, English or
American, in which the will or trust could not have been
so drafted as to carry out the client's essential desires
within the limits of the Rule. This means that our courts
in applying the Rule are not protecting the public welfare
against the predatory rich but are imposing forfeitures
upon some beneficiaries and awarding windfalls to others
because some member of the legal profession has been
inept."
But this claim does not withstand scrutiny. Poor draftsman-
ship can also be argued as a reason for urging retention of strict
enforcement of the Rule. There are two contraindications to the
Draft's position.
Quality of draftsmanship. First, why encourage poor
workmanship? The problem seems to be moot in California
thanks to statutory reform and a liberal judicial attitude.4"
However, the discussion has not been entirely closed-nor
should it be. Disapproval of the liberal position came from the
eminent authority, Richard R. Powell, who commented,
"Today, I would say that it is almost impossible in California
for a lawyer to draw an invalid will. . . . [This is undesirable
because] it encourages sloppy work."43
Changing the Rule in order to alleviate the misfortunes of
the victims of inexperienced drafting is a more drastic innova-
tion in the law than it appears to be. In every other area, a
client stands to win or lose on the basis of a combination of the
merits of his case and its development by his attorney. If ac-
commodation is made for a group that usually can well afford
to seek the best legal help available, logic would allow every
person who loses a case of any kind in the future to argue "poor
representation" on appeal. At present this argument rarely
succeeds precisely because of the policy that inadequate prepa-
ration should be discouraged.
Manipulation of the law. Providing a loophole for saving a
faulty instrument can only encourage attorneys to manipulate
the law in order to achieve the sometimes less than best mo-
tives of their clients. It is only when an instrument is chal-
lenged that it is defeated. Presumably, a clever draftsman can
41. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror 65
HARV. L. REV. 721, 739-45 (1952).
42. See discussion of perpetuities law in California in text accompanying notes
76-87 infra.
43. Interview with Richard R. Powell in Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 17, 1978).
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write in dispositive provisions that, if uncontested, would de-
feat the Rule, but nevertheless, even if it is contested, secure
the Rule's full period for delaying distribution of corpus by
counting on the future availability of liberal interpretation.
One result could be an increased number of suits brought to
challenge such documents."
Such gambling with the Rule is not a novel notion. It was
attempted in Hagemann v. National Bank & Trust Co. 45 There,
the Virginia Supreme Court specifically rejected wait and see
in favor of strict application of the common-law approach. The
court was antagonized by a disposition forbidding alienation of
an estate until the testatrix's youngest grandchild reached
twenty-five, with a parallel savings clause specifying distribu-
tion at twenty-one in case the first provision failed. Although
the court was asked to apply wait and see to the savings
clause,46 it adhered to the common-law rule and defeated the
improperly created class of remainder interests. The court rea-
soned that the testatrix knew the danger of remoteness and was
aware that "what she attempted would succeed so long as her
will was not challenged in court." Yet the savings clause was
inserted with a
deliberate purpose to violate but, if possible, evade the
effect of the rule against perpetuities, and if the rule were
ever invoked, to rewrite the rule so that it would be ac-
tuated only upon the "happening" of an event which made
remoteness an inevitability. But, as we have said, the rule
is actuated by the possibility of remoteness, and that pos-
sibility must be determined as of the date of the testatrix's
death.47
Two deductions can be drawn from Hagemann. First, it is
not always lack of sophistication that is at the heart of the
failure of an instrument. Second, liberalization of the Rule
could lead to its exploitation with the consequences of in-
creased perpetuities and litigation.
44. The initial impression fostered by wait and see is that it will reduce the
amount of litigation in this area of the law. Presumably, once the approach is accepted,
attorneys will avoid challenging a document to which it can be applied, at least until
the end of the perpetuities period. Issues could resolve themselves in the interim,
eliminating the need to go to court at all. The analysis in text accompanying notes 93-
94 infra indicates that such a theory may be overly optimistic.
45. 218 Va. 333, 237 S.E.2d 388 (1977).
46. 237 S.E.2d at 391.
47. Id. at 392 (emphasis in the original).
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Placing the Rule into Proper Historical Perspective
The Draft is self-contradictory in its discussion of the
Rule's rationale. In support of a new approach that will retain
more perpetuities than were allowed in the past, it puts forth
what appear to be good justifications for discouraging perpetui-
ties. These are: 1) to provide a balance between the desires of
the current owner of property to exercise control over its use
after his death and a future owner's ability to freely dispose of
it; 2) to promote the utilization of the wealth of society by
permitting its circulation through sale and resale; and, 3) to
keep property responsive to the needs of its living owners. 8
As historical support for maximizing perpetuities, the
Draft refers to a recent reexamination of the rationale underly-
ing the Rule by George L. Haskins."9 It interprets Haskins'
thesis to be that historically, the Rule was created as one in-
tended to encourage perpetuities. The Draft concludes that the
Rule's beginnings according to Haskins, and the way it pres-
ently operates, permitting the creation of valid future interests
that may not vest for as long as a hundred years, are "some
indication that the rule is a rule for perpetuities." 0 It is true
that Haskins rejected the traditional notion that the Rule was
originally formulated for the purpose of promoting alienability
of property. However, Haskins specifically states that at its
inception the Rule was "not a rule for perpetuities, but a rule
of perpetuities." 5'
Haskins analyzed The Duke of Norfolk's Case,52 which first
announced the elements of the Rule Against Perpetuities in
light of new socio-economic views of seventeenth century Eng-
land. He characterized the era as dominated by landed gentry
concerned with preservation of the property it had acquired,
not with the ready alienability that would have been fostered
by a mercantile, capitalist society.5 3 The compromise between
the particularized needs of this class and the heretofore tradi-
48. Draft, supra note 1, at 10-11.
49. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977).
50. Draft, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added).
51. Haskins, supra note 49, at 44 (emphasis added).
52. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682). Two earlier cases, Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b
(1609) and Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590 (1620) had recognized the validity of two types
of indestructible future interests. Draft, supra note 1, at 8-9 and Haskins, supra note
49, at 32-35.
53. Haskins, supra note 49, at 22.
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tional conservatism of English courts, which had favored max-
imization of alienability, gave birth to a "rule of perpetui-
ties."" The case permitted tying up land for a perpetuity lim-
ited to one lifetime or possibly two, by holding valid a springing
executory interest in a third son that was conditioned upon the
death of the eldest son within the lifetime of the second-born. 5
If the birth of the Rule was not conceived by sentiment
against perpetuities, neither was it created as one for perpetui-
ties. It is Haskins' contention that the Rule allowed perpetui-
ties, but within limits. Property owners were to be allowed to
exercise sufficient control from the grave to protect their accu-
mulated wealth from insane or profligate children, but this
control was to end within a period of time calculated to permit
alienability, and to free the living after an interim amenable
to the needs of society. As the case precipitated further con-
cessions by English judges to the will makers, the period of
perpetuities became formally established to require certain ful-
fillment of conditions within a measuring life plus twenty-one
years. In spite of occasional statutory adjustments by individ-
ual states, this has remained the permissible common-law pe-
riod of donative control in most American jurisdictions.
Haskins' work does not provide historical justification for
the Rule's expansion or contraction; neither should it be inter-
preted as encouraging the maximum utilization of the perpetu-
ity period where proper drafting of an instrument does not
allow it.
54. Id. at 44.
55. The Earl of Arundel and Surrey created two trust indentures for a term of
200 years after reserving life estates to himself and his widow, with remainders to his
younger children. The income from the barony of Grostock was to go to the Earl's
second son, Henry and his issue, during the life of the eldest son Thomas; but if
Thomas, who was insane, should die without leaving issue in the lifetime of Henry who
would then become the earl by inheritance, the rents and profits from the barony were
to go to the third son, Charles.
The issue arose when, upon the death of Thomas, Henry tried to consolidate both
his brothers' interests in himself by terminating Charles'. Charles brought a bill in
Chancery to demand the Grostock income now that the conditions to his taking had
been fulfilled. Henry resisted on the ground that the gift to Charles was in the nature
of a perpetuity and hence void. Id. at 36-37.
56. "Admittedly, Charles' interest in the term for years was not destructible, but
neither should it be void because Charles' interest would 'wear itself out' in a single
lifetime." Id. at 44. "Charles' interest would take effect, if at all, within Thomas'
lifetime and hence there existed no perpetuity." Id. at 45.
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Social Implications of Wait and See
Formulation of the second Restatement began with a revi-
sion of the Rule Against Perpetuities as it is applied to donative
transfers because it is the foundation of estate planning, setting
perimeters on the control that owners are permitted to exercise
in the disposition of their property after death. The Draft does
not address commercial transactions directly at this point, al-
though they could be affected where their long-term nature
invoked the sanction of the Rule. It is important to note that
courts analyze commercial transactions in the light of the
arms-length bargaining upon which they initially were based;
but in interpreting a donative transfer, they look to effectuat-
ing the intent of one person often long dead. It is appropriate
that in the latter case they be influenced by the additional
considerations of the needs of the living at the time of litigation
and the exigencies of society. For this reason, strict application
of the Rule, in order to free property from unnecessary, long-
term restriction, may be more vital to donative transfers than
commerical ones. While the latter are confronted with an ini-
tial two-sided examination by the contracting parties, the
donor's wisdom as it affects the individual needs of others and
the general economic requirements of society several years later
is questioned only by the few limits the law has imposed and
the amount of discretion a court is willing to exercise. How
strictly the Rule's limits are applied is a manifestation of cur-
rent attitudes toward controls on property dispostion.
Wait and see puts the law's imprimatur even more firmly
upon the concept that is commonly called "dead-hand" con-
trol, for the measure of a life and twenty-one years thereafter.
That much the law has allowed until now. A reformative tech-
nique like wait and see is injected as an issue where intent
would not necessarily have been in direct conflict with the law's
limits but for its incorrect expression. In such cases, the possi-
bilities' approach to the interpretation of an instrument defeats
it immediately upon challenge, while wait and see allows intent
some leeway to the extent of the time needed to see what in fact
does happen. The result is that wait and see will expand the
number of instances where the Rule is allowed to restrict free
and immediate use of property. It is not a radical extension of
the time period that is being proposed, merely that the full
period be permitted regardless of how an instrument is drafted.
Even this much is a radical innovation.
When a contract is poorly drawn, its chances of being up-
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held must suffer. A donative instrument is, in a sense, a con-
tract with society. Society has imposed certain restrictions
upon transfers and rules for carrying them out. Until now,
those rules have been strictly enforced in most states, perhaps
because the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities is an outer
limit reluctantly set. This policy is conceded within the Draft
itself:
The objections to the adoption of the wait-and-see
approach in determining the validity of non-vested inter-
ests under the rule against perpetuities are based on the
problems allegedly created by the uncertainties as to the
ultimate ownership of property during the period of wait-
ing and seeing what happens. This is not an objection to
the wait-and-see approach; it is an objection to the length
of the period of the rule."
Rather than loosen the reins on a horse headed in a question-
able direction, is it not better to stop for another look at the
map? The socio-economic questions involved in the present
time limitations of the Rule should be reexamined with an eye
toward setting firm priority upon either the free disposition of
property or encouraging restraints upon alienation."8 It is not
evident that this has been done even in California, as this
state's reform gained impetus from difficulties with the Rule in
57. Draft, supra note 1, at 17. These objections are based on the fact that the
best use of property may not be made during the hundred years that it is held for non-
vested interests:
It is at least questionable whether the period of the rule is on a sound
basis today, particularly when applied to legal interests in land. The
period of the rule may keep land out of the channels of commerce, where
legal non-vested interests in land are created, for over one hundred years.
That may be too long in our modern society.
Equitable non-vested interests under a trust do not affect the power
of the trustee to alienate the trust property itself, but do tend to keep the
beneficial flow from trust investments along predetermined lines for the
period of the rule, which again may be for a period of over one hundred
years.
Id. at 26 n.1. But wait and see ties up property which could have been released, even
if only through the fluke of an improperly drafted instrument.
58. In light of changed attitudes toward property rights in recent years, some
issues that have been suggested and should be firmly resolved before a new direction
is undertaken include whether: the old should be allowed monetary influence over the
lives of three generations even after death; trust interests in the country should be
assured of keeping capital under their control for the full term of the Rule; it is
beneficial to further the conservative investments of these trustees rather than give up
an estate to daring or careless hands; the rewards of owning property should go to those




Finally, the peculiar problems posed to individuals by wait
and see, and the behavioral attitudes it fosters, have been ig-
nored. Property interests that would otherwise fail have the
opportunity of being saved after a wait of a life and twenty-one
years. To some individuals it may be better to wait out this
time to see if property will be inherited than to lose it immedi-
ately. But what are the psychological consequences of waiting
around for a possible inheritance, or for that matter, of not
getting it in the end? Particularly distasteful is the notion that
the period may be spent waiting for someone to die or not be
born.
Summary
The Draft avoids examination of social issues underlying
the Rule and misapplies old doctrines. Whenever courts have
allowed some leeway into their otherwise relentless adherence
to the Rule, it has consisted of a mere common-sense admission
that ignoring past events is unrealistic. It has never been part
of the common law to permit violations of the Rule to be re-
solved by the occurrence of future events. Desirability of ame-
liorating the effects of unskilled draftsmanship should be
weighed against the alternatives of prolonged perpetuities and
possible manipulation of the Rule. The Rule's origins dictate a
compromise between those who desire to protect their property
and the law's disdain for restraints against alienation. Proposal
of wait and see has not been accompanied by sound arguments
in its favor.
PERPETUITIES LAW IN CALIFORNIA AND THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
A review of perpetuities law in California has a two-fold
purpose in the present context. One is to illustrate the inevita-
ble conflict between a state's legislated reform and the pro-
posed common-law doctrine, wait and see. The second purpose
is to show that where a reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities
is mandated, cy pres, as it is implemented in California, is a
viable alternative that provides immediate results.
59. See Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958)
and the discussion of perpetuities law in California. See text accompanying notes 77-
82 infra.
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California's Statutory Conflict
Should wait and see become the prevailing common-law
method of applying the Rule, California's response to the new
approach will be complicated by the fact that some of its own
relevant statutes have not yet been construed. In addition, it
is difficult to predict the direction the courts will take if an
instrument is capable of being interpreted under both
common-law and statutory doctrine. Examination of the perti-
nent statutes and cases provides an unsatisfactory result, as
the only clear indication to surface is that wait and see might
well have an unpredictable impact upon the law of this state.
The basic contradiction. California perpetuities law was
rooted in its constitution and has been developed by the legisla-
ture." The common-law period of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties6' and its conception of vesting were adopted by California
in 195162 as Civil Code section 715.2:
No interest in real or personal property shall be good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest and any
period of gestation involved in the situation to which the
limitation applies. The lives selected to govern the time of
vesting must not be so numerous or so situated that evi-
dence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult
to obtain. It is intended by the enactment of this section
to make effective in this State the American common-law
rule against perpetuities.13
Should the wait-and-see approach gain acceptance as the
American common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, California
courts will have to decide if this section requires that the new
common-law rule be made effective. Yet, section 1.4 of the
60. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715 (West Supp. 1978) replacing CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 9
(1879) (repealed 1970).
61. Perpetuities are allowed for charitable purposes, CAL. CIv. CODE § 715 (West
Supp. 1978) (added 1970); insurance trusts, CAL. Cv. CODE § 715.4 (West Supp. 1978)
(added 1959); and state retirement trusts, CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.3 (West Supp. 1978)
(added 1951, amended 1959).
62. For a history of the development of the Rule in this state, see Fraser &
Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 101 (1953). For a
discussion of California perpetuities law from 1951 to the enactment of the 1963 legisla-
tion and following, see Simes, Perpetuities in California Since 1951, 18 HASTINGS L.J.
247 (1967).
63. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.2 (West 1954)(emphasis added).
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Draft4 cannot be reconciled with the first sentence of the stat-
ute. The meaning of the emphasized words in combination
with the date of the statute's adoption testify that the legisla-
ture intended "to make effective" the possibilities approach to
the Rule, as that was the common-law rule in 1951.
Court rejection of wait and see. California has persistently
resisted the application of wait and see in determining the
validity of a disposition." This resolve was most recently reaf-
firmed by the in re Estate of Ghigliall court:
The determination as to whether a future interest
vests within the time allowed is made as of the moment the
instrument containing the limitation speaks; we are not
permitted to wait and see what happens in order to deter-
mine its validity. 7
Section 715.2 and the cases would seem to foreclose any en-
croachment by wait and see upon California law. Key amend-
ments designed to deal with the harshness of the common-law
approach, however, were added in 1963 .1s Two of them require
explanation in light of the new Restatement policy.
Shades of wait and see in California?
The more liberal attitude of the Restatement could influ-
ence California's decision regarding one of the legislature's 1963
64. "[A] donative transfer of an interest in property fails, if the interest does
not vest . . . within the period of the rule against perpetuities." Draft, supra note 1,
at 66.
65. "[I]t is not permitted to wait to see what happens in a disposition to deter-
mine the validity or invalidity of the trust," Kober Trust Fund, 26 Cal. App. 3d 265,
271, 103 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1972); "not permitted to wait to see", Estate of Gump, 16 Cal.
2d 535, 547, 107 P.2d 17, 23 (1940); 'the statute does not permit us to wait and see
whether events may not so transpire that in fact no perpetuity . . . results."' Sheean
v. Michel, 6 Cal. 2d 324, 327, 57 P.2d 127, 129 (1936); "provisions ... do not permit
us to wait and see what happens in order to determine the validity or invalidity of the
limitation," Estate of Troy, 214 Cal. 53, 57, 3 P.2d 930, 932 (1931); "the statute does
not permit us to wait and see whether events may not so transpire that in fac! no
perpetuity results," Estate of Steele, 124 Cal. 533, 537, 57 P. 564, 565-66 (1899).
66. 42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974).
67. Id. at 438, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
68. In addition to the two sections discussed, a provision to deal with the
"unborn widow" problem was added, asking courts to make an assumption of fact
whether it is true or false:
In determining the validity of a future interest in real or personal property
pursuant to Section 715.2 of this code, an individual described as the
spouse of a person in being at the commencement of a perpetuities period
shall be deemed a "life in being" at such time whether or not the individ-
ual so described was then in being.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.7 (West Supp. 1979)(added 1963).
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innovations. Section 715.6 provides an alternate period of sixty
years in all (commonly described as a period "in gross"), which
could work to lengthen or shorten the perpetuity period in indi-
vidual cases." The initial reaction to this untested provision,
was that it could have been in conflict with the constitutional
sanction against perpetuities; but the latter was repealed in
1970.70 The question remains as to how extensively section
715.6 should be used-whether it needs to be incorporated
within an instrument or whether courts will apply the alternate
time period in any case to save an otherwise failing interest.
On two occasions, California courts have implied a willing-
ness to wait and see which of the two time periods would permit
an interest to become valid. In United California Bank v.
Bottler,7' the court speculated:
[Nancy's] life cannot serve as a measure of the period
within which interests will vest. Nancy may live more than
21 years after the death of Raymond, and she may outlive
the alternative period of 60 years from the date of the
creation of the power as permitted by Civil Code, section
715.6.72
The Ghiglia court expressed a desire for guidance as to how the
new section should be applied73 at the same time it made this
observation:
Moreover, the child could be born more than 25 years after
the testator's death and would not reach age 35 within 60
years after the creation of the interest under the alterna-
tive period in gross provided by Civil Code section 715.6.11
Such dicta may imply that courts are willing to validate an
interest that vested within either period regardless of how an
69. Id. § 715.6 (West Supp. 1979).
70. Simes, supra note 62, at 266. Although the alternative period would not be
longer than lives in being and twenty-one years on the average, it could have been
contended that the only period in gross recognized by the common law rule is twenty-
one years. Id. at 261.
71. 16 Cal. App. 3d 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971).
72. Id. at 617, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
73. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 441 n.2, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 832 n.2. The court acknowledged
the reference to CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.6 (West Supp. 1979) in United California Bank
v. Bottler, 16 Cal. App. 3d at 617, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 231 and in Note, California Revises
the Rule Against Perpetuities-Again, 16 STAN. L. REV. 177, 185 (1963), which stated
that a choice between the common-law and alternate periods had to be made at the
creation of the instrument when it was unknown which period would be longer, because
California does not have a wait and see policy.
74. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 440-41, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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instrument is written. This interpretation, however, would not
be an application of wait and see as promulgated by the Draft.
There would be no waiting for the fulfillment of a condition;
rather, the court would have to decide whether to permit valid-
ity where either of two established standards is met. Such lib-
erality would conform to both Caliifornia's historic rejection of
wait and see and its statutory reform of the Rule. 5
The introduction of cy pres in California. The most signifi-
cant change in the California law was the 1963 addition of a cy
pres provision that allows courts, in spite of a specific invalid
disposition, to effectuate the general intent of the creator of an
interest whenever it can be ascertained. Section 715.5 provides:
No interest in real or personal property is either void
or voidable as in violation of Section 715.2 of this code if
and to the extent that it can be reformed or construed
within the limits of that section to give effect to the general
intent of the creator of the interest whenever that general
intent can be ascertained. This section shall be liberally
construed and applied to validate such interest to the full-
est extent consistent with such ascertained intent.7 6
The 1963 reform was a response to the harshness of the rule
as it was manifested in Haggerty v. City of Oakland.7 In
Haggerty, a lease whose term was to commence upon a date
after notice of completion of a building was held void on the
ground that there was a bare possibility at the time the lease
was executed that the estate granted would not commence
within lives in being and twenty-one years. Over a strong dis-
sent that a lease with a reasonable time provision had never
been held to violate the Rule 7 the court ruled that it had "no
power to consider reasonable probabilities or possibilities, or to
consider what has happened after the creation of the inter-
est." 9
Haggerty had caused as much concern in the judiciary as
it did in the legislature, for Wong v. DiGrazia,80 a similar lease
75. Simes' indicated that such interpretation of the provision is possible. Simes,
supra note 62, at 254-55.
76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1979).
77. 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958).
78. Id. at 424, 326 P.2d at 968 (Bray, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 418, P.2d at 964. CAL. CIv. CODE § 715.8 (West Supp. 1979)(added
1963), the section actually introduced to deal with the difficulties of the Rule im-
posed upon commercial transactions, was ironically repealed in 1970, having inspired
a more comprehensive reform of perpetuities law.
80. 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
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case, followed on the heels of the new amendments and soundly
disapproved its predecessor. The court looked to the Rule's
development and reasoned that "it does not facilely operate as
to commercial agreements in today's dynamic economy,"'" for
its
basic purpose ... was to limit family dispositions, and in
that context the period of lives in being plus 21 years
served as a proper measurement. Only later by an overex-
tension of nineteenth century concepts did the courts
apply the rule to commercial transactions.2
The court ruled that, although all contingent interests
must vest or fail within the period of the Rule, the lessees'
interest would vest upon completion of the building and there
was an obligation upon the lessors to complete construction
within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the lease of a
building under construction, whose term was to commence on
notice of completion did not violate the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties where all rights under the agreement arose, and breach was
remediable, within a twenty-one year period.
Commercial considerations changed the rules for donative
transactions. Both Haggerty and DiGrazia dealt with on-
completion lease terms, a relatively new commercial develop-
ment of the late fifties and early sixties. Unlike the Draft,
where the starting point is donative transfers, both the legisla-
ture and the Supreme Court of California responded to com-
mercial difficulties with the Rule. The DiGrazia court was at-
tempting to introduce a note of reason into the interpretation
of contracts that it felt should not be defeated on the basis of
a technicality that was not the essence of the transaction. Its
primary focus was to avoid "a rigid mechanistic operation of
the rule ' s3 upon commercial leaseholds. This leaves open the
question of whether the social ramifications of reforming the
Rule as it pertains to donative transfers were fully considered
when the reforms on both fronts were enacted. Nevertheless,
the cy pres provision has been applied by the appellate courts
so far with seemingly sensible results.
81. Id. at 533, 386 P.2d at 822, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 532, 386 P.2d at 822, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
[Vol. 191086
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Cy Pres is a Viable Doctrine
Cy pres shows promise in California. A review of Califor-
nia's application of the cy pres doctrine reveals that it is a
workable policy yielding immediate determination of questions
regarding property ownership. The three earliest cases in sym-
pathy with section 715.5 and DiGrazia, did not need to rely
upon the new rules in order to favor donative intent over rigid
application of the Rule. While producing an outcome in concert
with the new, liberal policy, each decision was in fact sup-
ported by use of traditional common-law methods.
In re Estate of Bird84 was resolved, for all practical pur-
poses, by use of the "second look" doctrine. The donee of a
power of appointment created a life estate in his children, with
the remainder to be distributed to his great-grandchildren,
upon the death of the last of the donee's issue who had been
alive on the date of his own death. Technically, such a disposi-
tion should have been made by the creator of the power, as the
date of vesting is as remote as can be validly achieved by an
owner of property. However, since only three months had
elapsed between the creation and exercise of the power, and
none of the measuring lives had changed in the interim, the
court looked to the facts and circumstances as of the time of
exercise and upheld the donee's disposition.
Similarly, California Bank v. Bottler5 had no need of new
authority to attain a result actually based on old policies, in-
cluding the doctrine of separability. Here, the donee of a power
of appointment postponed distribution of the relevant assets
until the death of his daughter, who had not been alive at the
time the power was created, and whose life could not serve to
measure the perpetuities period. The court gave the estate to
the daughter through an alternate provision of the document
in which the power had been created. At the same time, it
salvaged the intent of the donee of the power to have his daugh-
ter's property held in trust for life-by separating that portion
of the donor's will from the invalid provisions.
In Estate of Grove,8" the court invoked section 715.5 to
84. 225 Cal. App. 2d 196, 37 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1964).
85. 16 Cal. App. 3d 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971).
86. 70 Cal. App. 3d 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1977). A disinherited niece chal-
lenged a gift distributing corpus to the grandnieces and grandnephews of the testatrix
on the ground that the beneficiaries included after-born members of the class in viola-
tion of the Rule. Language in the instrument, however, referred to "living grandne-
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prevent invalidation of a superseding will and give effect to the
clear and ascertainable intent of the testatrix, but there was
enough evidence in the language of the second instrument to
satisfy a finding that the challenged reference to a class re-
ferred to its living members only. Although these cases relied
upon cy pres, traditional rules of construction could have pro-
duced the same results.
It is Ghiglial7 that illustrates the most significant use of the
new policy. The court relied upon section 715.5 to justify up-
holding, for the first time in California, a violation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. A spendthrift trust was attacked by the
testator's children on the ground that a class gift of the remain-
der to his grandchildren (including those born after the testa-
tor's death) when the youngest reached thirty-five, would not
vest within the period of the Rule. Although the doctrine of
separability was well-established in this state, in this case its
use would have excluded a member of the class born after the
testator's death in order to save the interests of the other mem-
bers, a result inimical to the testator's intent.
The court reformed the will, upholding the spendthrift
trust and saving the interests of all grandchildren by advancing
the date of vesting from thirty-five to twenty-one years of age.
It stated:
Of particular importance in the present case is CC §
715.5. While we have been unable to find a California case
applying the statute to uphold a testamentary disposition
in violation of the rule against perpetuities, courts in other
jurisdictions have taken such an approach. "
In spite of the availability of the cy pres statute, the court
looked to outside authority to support its utilization for radical
reformation of a will, an indication that traditional common-
law principles may still predominate here. If so, the possibility
exists that wait and see can have a significant impact." Where
the Restatement approach and section 715.5 are not in conflict,
it is difficult to predict where the courts will turn first.
Will the new approach be used at least to supplement the
California statute? In that case, the effect could be the imposi-
phews and grandnieces of myself" and gave $100 to each child born before the date of
her death. Id. at 363, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
87. 42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974).
88. Id. at 442, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
89. It was specifically rejected in this case. Id. at 438, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
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tion of a wait to see if a donor's intent is effectuated within the
period of the Rule with reformation of an instrument delayed
until the end. The most pronounced consequence of such a
policy would be prolonged fettering of property and uncertainty
as to its ownership. California has adopted what seems to be a
workable statute and made its peace with the Rule. Will it
allow its own compromise to be tested by the rigors of time, or
will it bow to the recommendations of the second Restatement?
Following the latter course would be taking a step backwards.
Advantages of cy pres over wait and see. Cy pres may have
been excluded from consideration by the writers of the second
Restatement because the doctrine is considered too radical a
change. By comparison, wait and see is seen as a more conserv-
ative approach."0 But, in order to make wait and see an effec-
tive, sensible doctrine, cy pres is often required anyway; that
is why it is incorporated as section 1.5 of the Draft." The inclu-
sion disregards the arguments against cy pres centering on the
courts' disdain for rewriting documents. If courts are to search
for a manifestation of a donor's intent and to compromise it
within the limits of the Rule anyway, what relevance has wait
and see to the overall objectives of this process except to post-
pone it? Those who will benefit most from such a wait are the
trust interests who will be assured of retaining the corpus of all
improperly disposed estates for the full period of the Rule.
Cy pres encourages a more efficient use of the doctrine of
separability. A subsequent separation of subject matters or
shares may not be in harmony with a donor's original plans for
all portions of his property and all possible recipients. Wait and
see is basically inconsistent with the notion that the doctrine
of separability must be used with skill so as not to defeat the
donor's overall objective,92 because it permits only those inter-
ests which can pass the test of time to be saved. Cy pres allows
a court to assume the testator's viewpoint and, for example,
decide whether to imply an interest in a member who would
otherwise lose it, or to eliminate a gift to a class as a whole
because the laws of intestate succession produce fairer results.
Such equity was among the purposes of adding section 1.5 to
the Draft,3 but the prior application of wait and see unneces-
90. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, supra note 5, at 43.
91. Draft, supra note 1, at 108.
92. California courts strive to adhere to such a policy of skillful application. See
In re Estate of Ghiglia, 42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974).
93. Draft, supra note 1, at 112-13.
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sarily clutters a sensibly developed doctrine.
Although wait and see might postpone or eliminate some
litigation, the common case where an age contingency is at-
tached to a class gift is a good example of the type of situation
where the proposed policy only complicates matters. The sim-
pler solution is to merely reduce the age requirement to twenty-
one immediately. Compare the results, in fact situations simi-
lar to that of Ghiglia,94 by applying the two methods. Cy pres
allowed the court to endorse the validity of a disposition consis-
ting of a spendthrift trust with remainder to vest in the grand-
children by adjusting the age requirement to twenty-one. The
grandchildren in the Ghiglia case were adults at the time of the
decision, so they will receive the remainder immediately at the
end of the last life estate. Had the grandchildren been younger
at the time of litigation, or if an additional grandchild is born
during the life estate period, the remainder will be distributed
when the youngest reaches age twenty-one. Litigation was re-
quired in this case to achieve a result in harmony with donative
intent and the precepts of the Rule. However, it is possible it
can be avoided in similar cases in the future as the application
of the cy pres statute becomes more predictable.
Interjecting wait and see delays the certainty of this out-
come and the release of the property in question. Upon the end
of the last life estate, assuming no additional births, the adult
grandchildren in Ghiglia would have to wait until they reached
the age of thirty-five to receive the remainder. If they were
under the age of fourteen, or had another grandchild been born
within the life estate period, a wait of up to twenty-one years
would be imposed to see if all these youngsters died, thus leav-
ing a valid disposition with rio need for litigation to those who
are thirty-five. (Even here, litigation could be necessary if the
dead grandchildren left unprovided-for issue.)"
The more likely (and optimistic) eventuality is that one or
more of such young children could be living and between
twenty-one and thirty-five years old at the end of the perpetu-
ity period. At this point the question of validity would arise and
would have to be resolved by use of California's section 715.5
and the cy pres section (1.5) of the Draft. For the advantage of'
avoiding litigation in an indeterminate number of cases, alien-
94. 42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974).
95. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 90 (West 1956); Estate of Gardner, 21 Cal. 3d 620,
580 P.2d 684, 147 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1978).
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ability and an immediate, clear-cut solution are postponed.
Cy pres is a better way to reduce both the number of suits
and also to improve the quality of motives for bringing them.
Challengers will hesitate to bring inconsistent claims knowing
that courts will reform an instrument to support donative in-
tent as well as the Rule. Wait and see begs the issue by holding
property and individuals in limbo to see if time will validate
an improperly structured instrument.
CONCLUSION
Development of the law is often a gradual and natural
response to the needs of society. When reform is deliberately
imposed, however, it is necessary to reexamine contemporary
values to make certain the proposed change conforms to them.
Before the wait-and-see approach is allowed to prolong perpe-
tuities that would have been invalidated, the desirability of
retaining perpetuities in the form of a rule hundreds of years
old should be carefully reevaluated.
California's law is presently in conflict with the wait-and-
see policy of the second Restatement. Furthermore, its own cy
pres doctrine is being sensibly applied with satisfactory results.
The recommended course for this state is to ignore wait and see
altogether.
Where it is determined that reform of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is desired, cy pres appears to be the best alterna-
tive. It eliminates confusion, avoids delay, and permits imme-
diate, intelligent resolution of problems created decades ago on
the basis of present-day requirements."
Leedia Gordeev Jacobs
96. The author gratefully acknowledges the kind and generous assistance of Pro-
fessor Dorothy J. Glancy, and thanks Professor Richard R. Powell for sharing his
insights concerning the Rule during two illuminating discussions on November 17, 1978
and March 1, 1979.
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